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Abstract Some studies have recently examined the effect of closeness on the prob-
ability of observing the monotonicity paradox in three-candidate elections under
Scoring Elimination Rules. It has been shown that the frequency of such paradox
significantly increases as elections become more closely contested. In this paper
we consider the effect of closeness on one of the most studied notions in Social
Choice Theory: The election of the Condorcet winner, i.e., the candidate who de-
feats any other opponent in pairwise majority comparisons, when she exists. To be
more concrete, we use the well known concept of the Condorcet efficiency, that is,
the conditional probability that a voting rule will elect the Condorcet winner, given
that such a candidate exists. Our results, based on the Impartial Anonymous Culture
(IAC) assumption, show that closeness has also a significant effect on the Condorcet
efficiency of different voting rules in the class of Scoring and Scoring Elimination
Rules.
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1 Introduction
In the literature of Social Choice Theory a wide variety of voting rules have been
proposed to determine the winner of an election with more than two competing
candidates. It is well known that the use of different voting rules may lead to
different winners. Thus, a great deal of controversy surrounds the discussion ofwhich
voting rule should be implemented. To overcome such discussion many different
criteria have been proposed in the literature. The most widely used one is the
Condorcet criterion which states that the candidate who is able to defeat all others
in pairwise majority comparisons, i.e., the Condorcet winner, should be the one
elected in the voting process. Unfortunately it is well known that the existence of the
Condorcet winner is not guaranteed. Therefore, it has become common to consider
the Condorcet efficiency (CE) as a measure of partial fulfillment of the Condorcet
criterion. Note that the CE of a voting rule is defined as the conditional probability
that the given voting rule elects the Condorcet winner, given that such a candidate
exists. As the CE involves the computation of probabilities of electoral events, it
is usually required to make some assumptions on the likelihood of the different
possible individual votes that could be observed. One of the most widespread used
assumptions is the Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) introduced by Kuga and
Nagatani (1974) and later developed by Gehrlein and Fishburn (1976).
The CE has been extensively studied under the IAC assumption. In particular,
a whole body of literature can be found regarding the CE of the Weighted Scoring
Rules (WSRs). Under those rules each candidate is awarded with a number of points
according to her relative position within each individual voter’s preference ranking
and the winner is the candidate with the highest total score. The Plurality Rule
(PR), the Negative Plurality Rule (NPR), and the Borda Rule (BR) are well known
examples of WSRs. It is also usual to find the IAC assumption in many papers
dealing with the CE of the Weighted Scoring Elimination Rules (WSERs) which
also constitute an important class of voting rules. Those rules also give points to
candidates according to their rank in voters’ preference orders and eliminate the
candidate(s) with the lowest number of points. The number of rounds is determined
by the number of candidates and the implemented method. The elected candidate
is the majority winner between the two remaining candidates in the last round. The
scoring rules that follow this process are calledWeighted Scoring Elimination Rules
(WSERs). The Plurality Elimination Rule (PER), the Negative Plurality Elimination
Rule (NPER) and the Borda Elimination Rule (BER) are widely known examples of
WSERs.
Related literature
Many research papers have already analyzed the CE on various voting rules taking
into account different assumptions on individuals’ preferences. Taking into account
the aim of this paper, we will only recall some relating results. The interested reader
can find an exhaustive review of this topic in the recent books of Gehrlein and
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Lepelley (2011, 2017). First of all, Gehrlein (1982, 1992) has calculated the CE
values of BR, PR, PER, NPR and NPER in three-candidate elections under the IAC
assumption for large electorates (Table 1).
Table 1 Condorcet efficiency values under the IAC assumption for large electorates
Voting rules IAC Condorcet efficiency
PR 0.8815a
BR 0.9111b
NPR 0.6296a
PER 0.9685a
NPER 0.9704a
a. Gehrlein (1982); b. Gehrlein (1992).
Also in the context of three-candidate elections under the IAC hypothesis,
Gehrlein and Lepelley (2001) have obtained a closed form representation of the
CE of BR as a function of the number of voters, and Cervone et al. (2005) have de-
veloped a representation for the CE of everyWSR. As a quite natural extension, many
studies have been carried out to deal with the effect of some additional assumptions
on the CE of several voting rules. For instance, Lepelley (1995) provided an exact
representation for the CE of WSRs when voters are endowed with single-peaked
preferences. Intuitively, voters are said to have single-peaked preferences if there is
an ideal outcome that they prefer the most, and alternatives that are further away from
this ideal outcome (according to some linear ordering) are less preferred (see for in-
stance, Brown et al., 2014). Gehrlein et al. (2012) and Gehrlein and Lepelley (2015)
dealt with the CE in the presence of degrees of group mutual coherence which mea-
sures a voting situation’s propensity to specific underlying rational behavior models
that may govern voter preferences. Finally, notice that many researchers have recon-
sidered the CE of voting rules by using a modified IAC model. For instance, we refer
the reader to Diss and Gehrlein (2015), among others.
It is important to mention that many studies have focused on other assumptions
on the individuals’ preferences when calculating the CE of several voting rules.
For instance, the Impartial Culture condition is used in Diss and Merlin (2010),
Diss et al. (2010), Gehrlein and Fishburn (1978a,b), Gehrlein and Lepelley (2014),
and Gehrlein and Valognes (2001), among others. The Dual Culture condition is
assumed for instance in Gehrlein (1999) and Gehrlein and Roy (2014) while the
Maximal Culture condition is considered in Gehrlein and Lepelley (1999), among
others. We again refer the reader to the books of Gehrlein and Lepelley (2011, 2017)
for more information on other research papers related to those assumptions and their
refinements.
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Our contribution
The central concern of this paper is to deal with the problem of the CE of many
common voting rules when the results of an election are closely contested. Specif-
ically, we focus on the following WSRs and WSERs voting rules: PR, PER, NPR,
NPER, and BR. Up to our knowledge, too little attention has been paid to this issue in
the literature. Recently, Miller (2017) has studied, in the context of three-candidate
elections, the effect of closeness on the probability of occurrence of monotonicity
paradox that is, getting more points from voters can make a candidate a loser and
getting fewer points can make a candidate a winner. The obtained results have re-
vealed that such probability can be very high under PER when the results of the
elections become very close. Lepelley et al. (2018) have extended the previous study
to otherWSERs and showed that the probability of occurrence of monotonicity para-
dox remains also very high for BER and NPER. To measure the election closeness,
Miller (2017) and Lepelley et al. (2018) have considered the ratio between the score
of the last ranked candidate and the sum of the scores of all competing candidates.
It seems from these research papers that closeness deserves more consideration in
Social Choice Theory.
In what follows, we derive an exact representation for the CE as a function of the
same closeness index that has been used by Miller (2017) and Lepelley et al. (2018).
Our results show that closeness also matters in our context since it affects negatively
the CE of the five considered voting rules. However, the effect of the closeness varies
through the different considered voting rules. Specifically, the CE of BR remains
relatively stable with the range of closeness index when compared to the one of PR,
PER, NPR, and NPER.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the basic notations
and definitions. In Section 3, we derive the analytical representations for the CE of
the five considered WSRs and WSERs and discuss our results. Section 4 is devoted
to summarize our findings, and to end, the proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2 Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, we consider n voters in three-candidate elections and denote
by C = {a, b, c} the set of candidates. Each voter is endowed with a linear preference
ordering on the candidates, i.e., she is able to rank the set of candidates from the most
desirable one to the least desirable one. We also assume that voters vote according
to their true preferences, which means that the strategic behaviors are not allowed in
this paper. In this setting, there are six possible linear preference rankings that voters
might have on C:
Ranking # Ranking # Ranking #
a  b  c n1 a  c  b n2 b  a  c n3
b  c  a n4 c  a  b n5 c  b  a n6
(1)
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The notation a  b  c in (1) means that the most preferred candidate of a voter is
a, themiddle-ranked candidate is b, and the least preferred one is c. A voting situation
can be defined by the 6-tuple n˜ = (n1,n2, . . . ,n6), where ni denotes the number of
voters endowed with the associated ith preference ranking, such that
∑6
i=1 ni = n.
Let us denote by aMb the event that candidate a defeats b in a pairwise majority
comparison, i.e., when more voters are endowed with a  b in their preference
rankings than with b  a. A Condorcet winner exists in a voting situation if there
is a candidate who would be able to defeat any other opponent in pairwise majority
comparisons. For instance, candidate a is a Condorcet winner if both aMb and
aMc hold, which is equivalent to respectively n1 + n2 + n5 > n3 + n4 + n6 and
n1 + n2 + n3 > n4 + n5 + n6 following our notation in (1). It is well known that such
a candidate does not necessarily exist which means that cycles of types aMb, bMc
and cMa or bMa, aMc and cMb can be observed in our framework. The Condorcet
efficiency of any given voting rule is the conditional probability that such a voting
rule selects the Condorcet winner, given that such a candidate exists.
In our setting of three-candidate elections, Weighted Scoring Rules (WSRs) can
be represented by the vector of weights (1, λ,0) such that 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. In other words,
each of the n voters assigns 1 point to her most preferred candidate, λ points to her
middle-ranked candidate, and 0 points to her least preferred candidate. A candidate’s
score is the total number of points summed over all voters, and the winner is the
candidate with the the highest total score from the voters. Let S(a), S(b) and S(c)
be the scores of candidates a, b, and c, respectively, under the WSR with weights
(1, λ,0). Taking into account our notation in (1), the scores of the candidates a, b,
and c are the following:
S(a) = n1 + n2 + λ (n3 + n5) (2)
S(b) = n3 + n4 + λ (n1 + n6) (3)
S(c) = n5 + n6 + λ (n2 + n4) (4)
To illustrate how a WSR works, let us assume that candidate a is the winner
under the WSR with weights (1, λ,0). In such a case, S(a) has to be greater than
both S(b) and S(c), i.e., n1 + n2 + λ (n3 + n5) > n3 + n4 + λ(n1 + n6) and n1 +
n2 + λ (n3 + n5) > n5 + n6 + λ (n2 + n4), respectively. Moreover, Weighted Scoring
Elimination Rules (WSERs) can also be represented by the vector of weights (1, λ,0)
in three-candidate elections. The two-stage election process works as follows: at the
first step, the lowest scored candidate under the corresponding WSR is eliminated;
in the second step, the candidate, with the highest number of votes between the
two remaining candidates, wins. For instance, assuming that candidate c is the
last ranked one under the WSR with weights (1, λ,0), the candidate a will be the
winner under the corresponding WSER if the three following inequalities hold:
n1+n2+λ (n3+n5) > n5+n6+λ (n2+n4), n3+n4+λ (n1+n6) > n5+n6+λ (n2+n4)
and n1 + n2 + n5 > n3 + n4 + n6.
In this paper, we focus on the following well known WSRs and WSERs:
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1. Plurality Rule (PR) which is the WSR with λ = 0. PR counts the number of times
each candidate is first ranked, and the winner is the candidate that gets the highest
number of first ranks.
2. Plurality Elimination Rule (PER) which is the WSER with λ = 0. In the first
step, the candidate with the fewest number of votes under PR is eliminated; in the
second step, the winner is the candidate with the highest number of votes between
the two remaining candidates.
3. Negative Plurality Rule (NPR) which is the WSR with λ = 1. NPR counts the
number of times each candidate is ranked last, and the winner is the candidate
that gets the fewest number of last ranks.
4. Negative Plurality Elimination Rule (NPER) which is the WSER with λ = 1.
This two stage voting rule operates in the same fashion as PER, with NPR being
used in the first step to determine the candidate to be eliminated from further
consideration.
5. Borda Rule (BR) which is the WSR with λ = 12 . Under this voting rule, voters
assign one point to their most preferred candidate, one-half point to their middle-
ranked candidate and zero points to their least preferred candidate. The winner is
the candidate who receives the greatest total number of points form the voters.
As mentioned before, BER is another well known WSER. More precisely, in a
three-candidate election, BER is defined as a two-step voting rule with BR being
used in the first stage following the same reasoning as PER and NPER. However, as it
is shown in Gehrlein and Lepelley (2015), this rule is the onlyWSER that guarantees
the selection of the Condorcet winner when such a candidate exists. Consequently,
the study of this rule is out of the scope of this paper.
In order tomeasure the closeness of an election, recall that the closeness index that
we consider is the ratio between the score of the last ranked candidate and the sum
of the scores of all competing candidates. Notice that the considered index increases
when elections become closer, reaching the value of 13 when the three candidates
obtain approximately the same score. Clearly, PR and PER share the same closeness
index since the two voting rules use the same weight, λ = 0. This is also true when
considering NPR and NPER where λ = 1.
Without loss of generality, assume that candidate c is last ranked under the
considered voting rule and let α1, α2, and α3 denote the closeness indices of PR/PER,
NPR/NPER, and BR, respectively. Taking into account our notation in (1), the
closeness indices α1, α2, and α3 are computed as follows:
α1 =
n5 + n6
n
(5)
α2 =
n2 + n4 + n5 + n6
2 n
(6)
α3 =
2 (n5 + n6) + n2 + n4
3 n
(7)
Recall that the objective of this paper is to derive the effect of closeness on
the CE of PR, PER, NPR, NPER, and BR. To find our probabilities, we need
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to assume a probability distribution that underlies how individual preferences are
considered. The probabilities that we investigate are driven by the well known
Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) condition (Gehrlein and Fishburn, 1976). In
our three-candidate setting, it states that all voting situations n˜ = (n1,n2, . . . ,n6),
such that
∑6
i=1 ni = n, for a specified number of voters n are equally likely to be
observed. As long as we take into account only voting events where elections are
supposed to be closely contested, we define the αi-IAC assumption, where α is the
closeness index and i = 1,2,3, based on the IAC condition as follows: all possible
voting situations n˜ = (n1,n2, . . . ,n6) having a concrete value of αi are equally likely
to be observed. To derive our probabilities, we use the parameterized Barvinok’s
algorithm (see for instance, Verdoolaege et al., 2004; Bruynooghe et al., 2005;
Lepelley et al., 2008). This algorithm allows us to compute the number of integer
solutions for systems of inequalities with parameters. The representation of this
number is given by quasi-polynomials with periodic coefficients (see for instance,
Ehrhart, 1962, 1967). Further results based on this algorithm has been provided by
Bubboloni et al. (2019); Diss (2015); Diss et al. (2012); Diss and Pérez-Asurmendi
(2016), among others. For our concern of large electorates, it is possible to obtain
the representation of the CE of the considered WSRs and WSERs as a function of
the corresponding closeness index αi , with i = 1,2,3.
3 Results and discussions
Propositions 1 provides the CE of PR under the α1-IAC assumption as a function of
its closeness index α1.
Proposition 1 Consider a three-candidate election with large electorates and α1 the
proportion of points obtained by the last ranked candidate over the total number of
points under PR. Then, theCEof PRunder theα1-IACassumption is given as follows:
CE∞PR(α1) =

72α13 − 22α12 − 27α1 + 8
8(11α13 − 4α12 − 3α1 + 1) for 0 ≤ α1 <
1
4
(2α1 − 1)
(
12α12 − 15α1 + 5
)
4(18α13 − 18α12 + 6α1 − 1) for
1
4
≤ α1 ≤ 13
Propositions 2 provides the CE of PER under the α1-IAC assumption as a function
of its closeness index α1.
Proposition 2 Consider a three-candidate election with large electorates and α1 the
proportion of points obtained by the last ranked candidate over the total number of
points under PR. Then, the CE of PER under the α1-IAC assumption is given as
follows:
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CE∞PER(α1) =

10α13 − 4α12 − 3α1 + 1
11α13 − 4α12 − 3α1 + 1 for 0 ≤ α1 <
1
4
(2α1 − 1)
(
6α12 − 3α1 + 1
)
18α13 − 18α12 + 6α1 − 1 for
1
4
≤ α1 ≤ 13
Notice that CEnPR(0) = 1 for all n. To show this, let us assume, without loss of
generality, that a is the Condorcet winner and c is the last ranked candidate under
PR. If α1 = 0, then n5 = n6 = 0. Therefore, the scores of the candidates a and b
under PR are S(a) = n1 + n2 and S(b) = n3 + n4, respectively. Since a beats b in
pairwise majority comparisons (n1 + n2 > n3 + n4), we have S(a) > S(b). In such
a case, candidate a will be elected under PR with absolute certainty. Similarly, it
is also possible to show that CEnPER(0) = 1 for any given number of voters n. In
Figure 1, we represent graphically the results from Propositions 1 and 2. Specifically,
we illustrate the CE of PR and PER according to their closeness index α1. Clearly,
closeness significantly affects the CE of both voting rules. The CEs of PR and
PER tends to dramatically decline as the election becomes closely contested. Notice
that, in both cases, the decrease is stronger when α1 belongs to the interval [ 14 , 13 ].
Nevertheless, the decrease is larger for PR than for PER. In the case of PR, the CE
tends to a value of 13 whereas in the case of PER, the CE tends to a value of
2
3 . In
other words, PER remains more Condorcet consistent than PR over all the range of
the closeness index α1.
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Fig. 1 Condorcet efficiency of PR and PERas a function of their closeness index for large electorates
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Propositions 3 provides the CE of NPR under the α2-IAC as a function of the
closeness index α2.
Proposition 3 Consider a three-candidate election with large electorates and α2 the
proportion of points obtained by the last ranked candidate over the total number of
points under NPR. Then, the CE of NPR under the α2-IAC assumption is given as
follows:
CE∞NPR(α2) =

5α2 − 4
8 (2α2 − 1) for 0 ≤ α2 <
1
4
510α23 − 510α22 + 165α2 − 17
2 (144α23 − 144α22 + 48α2 − 5) for
1
4
≤ α2 ≤ 13
Propositions 4 gives the CE of NPER under the α2-IAC as a function of the
closeness index α2.
Proposition 4 Consider a three-candidate election with large electorates and α2 the
proportion of points obtained by the last ranked candidate over the total number of
points under NPR. Then, the CE of NPER under the α2-IAC assumption is given as
follows:
CE∞NPER(α2) =

1 for 0 ≤ α2 < 14
2 (120α23 − 120α22 + 39α2 − 4)
144α23 − 144α22 + 48α2 − 5 for
1
4
≤ α2 ≤ 13
Notice that for any given number of voters n, CEnNPR(0) = 12 . Indeed, when
α2 = 0 (i.e., n2 = n4 = n5 = n6) and λ = 1, the scores of candidates a, b, and c are
given by S(a) = S(b) = n1 + n3 and S(c) = 0. Thus, NPR will elect a and b with
the same probability due to the symmetry of IAC-like assumption with respect to
candidates. This means that CEnNPR(0) = 12 . Notice also that for any given number
of voters n, CEnNPER(α2) = 1 for 0 ≤ α2 < 14 . To prove this statement, suppose
that the Condorcet winner, say a, is not elected under NPER. This implies that a is
eliminated in the first round under NPR; otherwise, she would win the election since
she is supposed to be the Condorcet winner. In addition, α2 is supposed to be less
than 14 , which implies that n1 + n2 + n3 + n5 < n4 + n6 (i). Since aMb, then we can
show that n3 + n4 + n6 + n3 < n1 + n2 + n3 + n5 (ii). From (i) and (ii), we deduce that
n3 +n4 +n6 +n3 < n4 +n6, which implies that n3 < 0. Because of this contradiction,
candidate a will be elected with absolute certainty under NPER. We plot the results
from Propositions 3 and 4 in Figure 2 supplying a graphical representation of the
CE of NPR and NPER as a function of the closeness index α2. From Figure 2, it is
clear that the performance of NPER in terms of the CE is significantly better than
the one of NPR with independence of the value of α2. More specifically, the CE of
NPER takes values in the interval ] 23 ,1] whereas in the case of NPR the CE values
are located in the range ] 13 ,0.6875]. Recall that in the case of NPER the CE reaches
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the value of 1 over the range 0 ≤ α2 ≤ 14 ; for values of α2 greater than 14 , that is, as
elections are very close, we found that the CE decreases until the value of 23 . In the
case of NPR, the behavior of the CE is slightly different for lower values of α2. To
be more concrete, it increases from 0 to 0.25 and decreases from 0.25 to 13 .
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Fig. 2 Condorcet efficiency of NPR and NPER as a function of their closeness index for large
electorates
Finally, Proposition 5 provides the CE of BR under the α3-IAC assumption as a
function of the closeness index α3.
Proposition 5 Consider a three-candidate election with large electorates and α3 the
proportion of points obtained by the last ranked candidate over the total number
of points under BR. Then, the CE of BR under the α3-IAC assumption is given as
follows:
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CE∞BR(α3) =

21α3 − 8
2 (9α3 − 4) for 0 ≤ α3 <
1
9
243α34 + 324α33 − 486α32 + 36α3 − 1
648α33 (9α3 − 4) for
1
9
≤ α3 < 16
70227α34 − 46332α33 + 11178α32 − 1260α3 + 53
75816α34 − 49248α33 + 11664α32 − 1296α3 + 54 for
2
9
≤ α3 < 518
20331α34 − 23436α33 + 9234α32 − 1500α3 + 89
2 (13608α34 − 15120α33 + 5832α32 − 936α3 + 55) for
5
18
≤ α3 < 29
25587α32 − 11466α3 + 1339
16 (1647α32 − 732α3 + 85) for
2
9
≤ α3 ≤ 13
It can be noticed thatCEnBR(0) = 1 for any given number of voters n. To show this
statement, let us assume, without loss of generality, that candidate a is the Condorcet
winner while c is the last ranked candidate under BR. If α3 = 0, it follows that
n2 = n4 = n5 = n6. In such a case, S(a) − S(b) = n1−n33 > 0 because a beats c in
pairwise majority comparisons (n1 > n3). Since candidate c is supposed to receive
zero points, candidate a is elected under BR with absolute certainty. We represent
graphically the results from Proposition 5 in Figure 3. As it can be seen, the CE
of BR ranges within the interval [0.8983,1]. The CE decreases when the closeness
index takes values from 0 to 0.22 whereas it increases when the closeness index
ranges from 0.22 to 13 .
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Fig. 3 Condorcet efficiency of BR as a function of its closeness index for large electorates
Finally, Table 2 summarizes some numerical values of the CE of the five consid-
eredWSRs andWSERs for different values of the closeness index αi , with i = 1,2,3.
Table 2 Computed values of the CE of PR, BR, NPR, PER, and NPER for large electorates
αi CE
∞
PR (α1) CE∞PER (α1) CE∞NPR (α2) CE∞NPER (α2) CE∞BR (α3)
0 1 1 0.5 1 1
0.02 0.9925 1.0000 0.5078 1 0.9921
0.04 0.9850 0.9999 0.5163 1 0.9835
0.06 0.9772 0.9997 0.5256 1 0.9740
0.08 0.9689 0.9993 0.5357 1 0.9634
0.1 0.9598 0.9985 0.5469 1 0.9516
0.12 0.9494 0.9971 0.5592 1 0.9384
0.14 0.9370 0.9948 0.5729 1 0.9243
0.16 0.9218 0.9911 0.5882 1 0.9118
0.18 0.9020 0.9852 0.6055 1 0.9030
0.20 0.8750 0.9756 0.6250 1 0.8988
0.22 0.8357 0.9596 0.6473 1 0.8987
0.24 0.7736 0.9315 0.6731 1 0.9021
0.25 0.7273 0.9091 0.6875 1 0.9050
0.26 0.6737 0.8821 0.7011 0.9917 0.9087
0.28 0.5698 0.8254 0.6606 0.9390 0.9175
0.3 0.4731 0.7665 0.5640 0.8537 0.9264
0.32 0.3857 0.7067 0.4320 0.7457 0.9336
( 13 )− 0.3333 0.6667 0.3333 0.6667 0.9375
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4 Conclusion
The main purpose of this study has been to provide new evidence of the effect of
election closeness on the theoretical probability of electoral events. We have consid-
ered the impact of election closeness on the probability of selecting the Condorcet
winner, when such a candidate exists, under several well known voting rules. In
other words, the main aim of our study is to measure at which extend the CE of a
given voting rule changes when the elections become more closely contested. For
this purpose, we have focussed on five popular WSRs and WSERs in the context of
three-candidate elections. The first three rules, PR, NPR, and BR, choose the winner
in one step while the last two rules, PER and NPER, do in a two-step iterative pro-
cess. Election closeness has been measured in our paper by an index calculated as a
proportion of points obtained by the last ranked candidate divided by the aggregated
scores of all competing candidates under the given WSR/WSER. We followed an
IAC-like assumption, by considering that every voting situation, with a given value
of election closeness index, is equally likely to occur. As a result, we calculate the
CE of the considered WSRs and WSERs for large electorates as a function of the
corresponding closeness index. We show that the CE of some WSRs and WSERs
may significantly decrease as the results of elections become very close. However,
such reduction varies depending on the considered voting rule; the CE does not
substantially decrease under BR as it does in the case of the other analyzed WSRs
and WSERs.
Finally, we believe that many extensions of our paper can be considered since
many open questions still remain unanswered. given that we have only studied the
CE of some commonWSRs and WSERs, the extension of our results to other voting
rules remains open. In addition, we have analyzed in this paper the performance
of several voting rules according to their CE but it is worthy to analyze the impact
of election closeness on other interesting voting paradoxes. The reader can find an
overview about different voting paradoxes that can be considered for this exciting
topic in Gehrlein and Lepelley (2011, 2017) and Nurmi (1999).
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5 Appendix
We only provide the proof of Proposition 1 which will allow the reader to understand
the steps taken into account in order to derive the analytical representations for the
CE under the αi-IAC assumption. Complete proofs for the other voting rules are
available upon request.
Let us assume, without loss of generality, that candidate c is the last ranked one
under PR. In such a case, the closeness index is given by α1 = n5+n6n =
k
n where
k = n5 + n6 is the score of candidate c under PR. Recall that the CE of a giving
voting rule is a conditional probability. In our setting, in order to compute the CE
of PR under the α1-IAC assumption, we first need to count the number of voting
situations for which the Condorcet winner exists under the α1-IAC assumption when
candidate c is the last ranked one under PR. In order to accomplish this goal, we
need to consider the three following independent events:
X1 = “a is the Condorcet winner and c is last ranked under PR".
X2 = “b is the Condorcet winner and c is last ranked under PR".
X3 = “c is the Condorcet winner and c is last ranked under PR".
Let us denote by |DXj (k,n)| the number of voting situations for which event Xj
is observed under the α1-IAC assumption, i.e., when α1 = kn takes a given value.
The number |DXj (k,n)| depends on the number of voters n and the score k of the
candidate c under PR. Using those notations, the number of voting situations for
which the Condorcet winner exists under the α1-IAC assumption when candidate c
is the last ranked one under PR can be written as follows:
|DX1 (k,n)| + |DX2 (k,n)| + |DX3 (k,n)| (8)
Due to the symmetry of IAC-like assumptions with respect to candidates, we can
easily show that |DX1 (k,n)| = |DX2 (k,n)|. This means that the number of voting
situations in (8) can also be written as follows:
2 |DX1 (k,n)| + |DX3 (k,n)| (9)
Thus, all that we have to do is to calculate |DX1 (k,n)| and |DX3 (k,n)|. Notice
first that |DX1 (k,n)| corresponds to the number of voting situations satisfying the
following system of (in)equalities:
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n1 + n2 − n5 − n6 > 0
n3 + n4 − n5 − n6 > 0
n5 + n6 = k
n1 + n2 − n3 − n4 + n5 − n6 > 0
n1 + n2 + n3 − n4 − n5 − n6 > 0
n > 3k
n1 + n2 + n3 + n4 + n5 + n6 = n
ni ≥ 0 for i ∈ {1, . . . ,6}
k ≥ 0
(10)
As noticed before, we compute the number of voting situations that fulfill these
conditions using the Parametrized Barvinok’s algorithm. Such algorithm allows to
quantify the number of integer solutions for systems of (in)equalitieswith parameters.
In our study, given the two parameters n and k, the number of voting situations for
the system (10) is provided by bivariate quasi-polynomials in n and k with 2-periodic
coefficients meaning that such coefficients depend on the parity of the parameters
n and k. We represent these coefficients by a list of 2-rational numbers enclosed in
square brackets. To illustrate, the coefficient [a, b]n will be either a when n is even
or b when n is odd. The program indicates that the corresponding quasi-polynomial
for the system (10) is given as follows:
1. If n4 ≤ k ≤ n−23 :
|DX1 (k,n)| =
3
2
k4 + f1 k3 + f2 k2 + f3 k + f4
where,
f1 = −2 n +
[
7
2
, 2
]
n
f2 =
9
8
n2 +
[
−7
2
, −3
2
]
n
+
[
1,
7
8
]
n
f3 = −13 n
3 +
[
9
8
,
1
8
]
n
n2 +
[
−2
3
, −7
6
]
n
n +
[
0, −5
8
]
n
f4 =
1
24
n4 +
[
−1
8
,
1
24
]
n
n3 +
[
1
12
,
5
24
]
n
n2 +
[
0, − 1
24
]
n
n +
[
0, −1
4
]
n
2. If 0 ≤ k ≤ n−44 :
|DX1 (k,n)| =
5
6
k4 + g1 k3 + g2 k2 + g3 k + g4
where,
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g1 = −13 n +
[
19
6
,
10
3
]
n
g2 = −14 n
2 +
[
−11
4
, −3
]
n
n +
[
5
3
,
17
12
]
n
g3 =
1
12
n3 +
[
1
8
,
1
4
]
n
n2 +
[
−3, −11
4
]
n
n +
[
−5
3
, −19
12
]
n
g4 =
1
12
n3 +
[
3
8
,
1
2
]
n
n2 +
[
− 7
12
, − 1
12
]
n
n +
[
−1, −1
2
]
n
|DX3 (k,n)| corresponds to the number of voting situations satisfying the following
system of (in)equalities:
n1 + n2 − n5 − n6 > 0
n3 + n4 − n5 − n6 > 0
n5 + n6 = k
−n1 + n2 − n3 − n4 + n5 + n6 > 0
−n1 − n2 − n3 + n4 + n5 + n6 > 0
n > 3k
n1 + n2 + n3 + n4 + n5 + n6 = n
ni ≥ 0 for i ∈ {1, . . . ,6}
k ≥ 0
(11)
Using again the Parametrized Barvinok’s algorithm, the program indicates that
the corresponding quasi-polynomial for the system (11) is given as follows:
1. If n−14 ≤ k ≤ n−23 :
|DX3 (k,n)| =
3
2
k4 + h1 k3 + h2 k2 + h3 k + h4
where,
h1 = −2 n +
[
7
2
, 2
]
n
h2 =
3
4
n2 +
[
−7
2
, −3
]
n
n +
[
5
2
, −1
4
]
n
h3 = − 112 n
3 + n2 +
[
−5
3
, −11
12
]
n
n +
[
1
2
, −1
]
n
h4 = − 112 n
3 +
1
4
n2 +
[
−1
6
,
1
12
]
n
n +
[
0, −1
4
]
n
2. If 0 ≤ k ≤ n−24 :
|DX3 (k,n)| =
1
6
k4 +
[
1
6
,
2
3
]
n
k3 +
[
−1
6
,
5
6
]
n
k2 +
[
−1
6
,
1
3
]
n
k
In order to calculate the CE of PR under the α1-IAC assumption, the three
following independent events have to be taken into consideration:
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Y1 = “a is the Condorcet winner, a is chosen under PR, and c is last ranked under PR".
Y2 = “b is the Condorcet winner, b is chosen under PR, and c is last ranked under PR".
Y3 = “c is the Condorcet winner, c is chosen under PR, and c is last ranked under PR".
It follows that the CE of PR under the α1-IAC assumption is given in general by
the following function in n and k:
|DY1 (k,n)| + |DY2 (k,n)| + |DY3 (k,n)|
2 |DX1 (k,n)| + |DX3 (k,n)|
(12)
We can show that |DY3 (k,n)| = 0 because when candidate c is chosen under PR
it cannot be last ranked by this voting rule. Again, due to the symmetry of IAC-
like assumptions with respect to candidates, we can also show that |DY1 (k,n)| =
|DY2 (k,n)|. It follows that the CE of PR under the α1-IAC assumption in (12) can
also be calculated as follows:
2 |DY1 (k,n)|
2 |DX1 (k,n)| + |DX3 (k,n)|
(13)
|DY1 (k,n)| corresponds to the number of voting situations satisfying the following
system of (in)equalities: 
n1 + n2 − n5 − n6 > 0
n3 + n4 − n5 − n6 > 0
n1 + n2 − n3 − n4 > 0
n5 + n6 = k
n1 + n2 − n3 − n4 + n5 − n6 > 0
n1 + n2 + n3 − n4 − n5 − n6 > 0
n > 3k
n1 + n2 + n3 + n4 + n5 + n6 = n
ni ≥ 0 for i ∈ {1, . . . ,6}
k ≥ 0
(14)
The program indicates that the corresponding quasi-polynomial of the system
(14) is given as follows:
1. If k ≤ (n − 4)/4:
|DY1 (k,n)| =
3
4
k4 + F1(k,n)k3 + F2(k,n)k2 + F3(k,n)k + F4(k,n)
where,
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F1(k , n) = −1148n +
[ [
19
6
,
53
16
]
n
,
[
79
24
,
51
16
]
n
]
k
F2(k , n) = − 932n
2 +
[ [
−21
8
, −23
8
]
n
,
[
−45
16
, −43
16 n
]
k
]
n +
[ [
2,
53
32
]
n
,
[
7
4
,
59
32
]
n
]
k
F3(k , n) = 112n
3 +
[ [
1
16
,
3
16
]
n
,
[
1
8
,
1
8
]
n
]
k
n2 +
[ [
−19
6
, −35
12
]
n
,
[
−149
48
, −137
48
]
n
]
k
n
+
[ [
−5/3, −27
16
]
n
,
[
−43
24
, −21
16
]
n
]
k
F4(k , n) = 112n
3 +
[ [
3
8
,
1
2
]
n
,
[
13
32
,
13
32
]
n
]
k
n2 +
[ [
− 7
12
, − 1
12
]
n
,
[
−25
48
, −19
48
]
n
]
k
n
+
[ [
−1, −1
2
]
n
,
[
−1, −23
32
]
n
]
k
2. If n−34 ≤ k ≤ n−33 :
|DY1 (k,n)| =
3
4
k4 + G1(k,n)k3 + G2(k,n)k2 + G3(k,n)k + G4(k,n)
where,
G1(k , n) = −2516n +
[ [
1
2
, −11
16
]
n
,
[
5
8
, −13
16
]
n
]
k
G2(k , n) = 3932n
2 +
[ [
−5
8
,
9
8
]
n
,
[
−13
16
,
21
16
]
n
]
kn
+
[ [
0,
5
32
]
n
,
[
−1
4
,
11
32
]
n
]
k
G3(k , n) = − 512n
3 +
[ [
5
16
, − 9
16
]
n
,
[
3
8
, −5
8
]
n
]
k
n2 +
[ [
1
6
, − 1
12
]
n
,
[
11
48
, − 1
48
]
n
]
k
n +
[ [
0,
1
16
]
n
,
[
−1
8
,
7
16
]
n
]
k
G4(k , n) = 596n
4 +
[
− 1
16
,
1
12
]
n
n3 +
[ [
− 1
12
, − 1
48
]
n
,
[
− 5
96
, −11
96
]
n
]
k
n2 +
[ [
0, − 1
12
]
n
,
[
1
16
, −19
48
]
n
]
k
n
+
[ [
0, − 1
32
]
n
,
[
0, −1
4
]
n
]
k
3. Otherwise, |DY1 (k,n)| = 0.
Notice that it is possible to represent the above results as functions of the closeness
index α1. If we assume large electorates and replace k by α1 n in the above results,
we obtain functions in α1 by only considering the terms of higher degree in each
function. Let us then denote by |D∞Xj (α1)| the number of voting situations for which
event Xj is observed under the α1-IAC assumption with large electorates. It follows
that:
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|D∞X1 (α1)| =

α1
(
10α13 − 4α12 − 3α1 + 1
)
n4
12
for 0 ≤ α1 ≤ 14
(3α1 − 1) (2α1 − 1)
(
6α12 − 3α1 + 1
)
n4
24
for
1
4
≤ α1 ≤ 13
(15)
|D∞X3 (α1)| =

α41 n
4
6
for 0 ≤ α1 ≤ 14
α1 (3α1 − 1)
(
6α12 − 6α1 + 1
)
n4
12
for
1
4
≤ α1 ≤ 13
(16)
|D∞Y1 (α1)| =

α1
(
72α13 − 22α12 − 27α1 + 8
)
n4
96
for 0 ≤ α1 ≤ 14
(3α1 − 1) (2α1 − 1) n4
96
for
1
4
≤ α1 ≤ 13
(17)
By replacing (15), (16), and (17) in (13) we derive the CE of PR as a function of
the closeness index α1 for large electorates as follows:
CE∞PR(α1) =

72α13 − 22α12 − 27α1 + 8
8(11α13 − 4α12 − 3α1 + 1) for 0 ≤ α1 <
1
4
(2α1 − 1)
(
12α12 − 15α1 + 5
)
4(18α13 − 18α12 + 6α1 − 1) for
1
4
≤ α1 ≤ 13
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